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COMMENTS

THE RIGHT TO DIE: AN EXTENSION OF THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In August of 1984, the Detroit Metro Times was asked to list a
classified ad seeking a compassionate individual to euthanize a severely paralyzed accident victim.1 Although the newspaper found
such an advertisement unacceptable, it sought to discover the individual's identity. 2 Further inquiry disclosed an unbearable personal
tragedy that compelled a once vibrant person to seek a painless, dig3
nified death.
The victim, Mathew, 4 was severely injured when his motorcycle struck an oncoming car.5 His spinal cord was severed as he collided with the car windshield. 6 As a result of the accident, Mathew
is now a quadriplegic. 7 Though Mathew has limited use of his
hands, his legs will always be useless.8 He requires constant atten1. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 28, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Tribune]. Euthanasia is the mercy act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from an incurable and distressing disease. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979). For a general discussion of euthanasia and its
legal ramifications, see Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of
Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 474 (1974); Comment, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia,36 ALB. L. REV. 674 (1972); Comment, The
Right to Die, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 613 (1974); Comment, ProposedState Euthanasia Statutes: A Philosophicaland Legal Analysis, 3 HoFSTRA L. REV. 115 (1975);
Comment, In re Storar: Euthanasia for Incompetent Patients, A Proposed
Model, 3 PACE L. REV. 351 (1983); Note, Live or Let Die: Who Decides an Incompetent's Fate? In Re Eichner,1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 387 (1982).
2. Tribune,supra note 1, at 1, col. 1. It is a crime to seek help to kill yourself. See infra note 14.
3. Tribune, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
4. Mathew is not the young man's true name. His name has been changed
at his request.
5. Tribune, supra note 1, at 2, col. 1.
6. Id. at 1, col. 3.
7. Id. Up until his accident, Mathew had been an outdoorsman. Id. at 1,
col. 2. He loved being in the woods, studying the trees, wildlife and nature. Id.
The possibilities were limitless for a young, healthy, enterprising teenager; especially for Mathew who had planned to attend college. Id. at col. 3. Because
he lacked the finances, Mathew signed for three years of Army duty to help pay
for his education. Id. His accident occurred on the way home from visiting his
terminally ill grandmother just prior to leaving for basic training. Id. at 2, col. 1.
As a result of the accident, Mathew had a break in his fifth vertebrae, causing
paralysis from that point of his spinal cord down. Id. at 1, col. 3.
8. Id. at 2, col. 2.
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tion. Muscle spasms sometimes jerk him into dangerous positions.9
His skin is so tender that wearing even a light shirt is painful.1 0
These are only a few examples of the problems Mathew must cope
with daily. 1 ' The constant emotional, physical and psychic pain
that Mathew suffers has taken its toll on him and those around
him, and thus he sought relief through death. 12 This desire
prompted him to send his classified ad to the Detroit Metro Times.
In a life-oriented society the expression of a desire to die is
often controversial and misunderstood. Indeed, our society has expressed through its criminal law the moral judgment that, with certain narrow exceptions, 13 all forms of killing are wrong.14 Our
courts, however, are increasingly being called upon to determine
the legal ramifications of when an individual, such as Mathew, decides that death is preferable to an intolerable life.' 5 The exigency
of the circumstances often renders prolonged judicial consideration
unacceptable. 16 A reliable solution, yielding more predictable re9. Id. at col. 3.
10. Id.
11. Mathew must also constantly sip water through a long straw rigged to a
nearby coffee pot to maintain his low body temperature. Id. at col. 4. A catheter running through his abdomen is a constant source of infection. Id. His bowels function sporadically and only with the aid of suppositories. Id. Sitting up
in a chair with the aid of a nurse takes over an hour; a simple shower takes four
hours. Id. at col. 6.
12. Id. at col. 5.
13. The most common exceptions are capital punishment and war.
14. See Richard, ConstitutionalPrivacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning
of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 327, 372 (1981). The underlying moral condemnation of all acts inflicting death rests on a number of
grounds:
(1) life as God's property, (2) life as the property of the state, (3) the immorality of despair, (4) life as the unalienable basis of moral personality,
(5) harms to determinate third parties, (6) paternalistic arguments about
the irrationality of a decision to die, and (7) wedge arguments [arguments
asserting that while some decisions to die may be rationale, there is no way
to express in law this judgment without allowing in arguments for killing
that are clearly unethical].
Id. While suicide itself is no longer a crime in most states, aiding and abetting
suicide is a criminal offense. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 568-91 (1972). Because the victim's consent is not an affirmative defense in a criminal prosecution for homicide, a person who is incapable of
committing suicide is also prevented from permitting another to terminate his
life. See id. at 408. Euthanasia is treated, therefore, as a form of murder. This
explains the unacceptability of Mathew's ad. See supra text accompanying note
2.
15. For a discussion of state and federal cases considering this issue, see
infra notes 23-63.
16. Recently, two decisions permitting the termination of life support measures were rendered after the individuals in question had already died. On December 27, 1984, a California Court of Appeals awarded a posthumous victory to
William F. Bartling, who died in November of 1984. Bartling v. Superior Court,
No. B007907, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1984). The Superior Court of New
Jersey held that a competent patient has the right to decline any medical treatment including feedings, and should retain that right when and if he becomes
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sults, is therefore desirable.
Whether the problem takes the form of terminating life support systems 17 or refusing medical treatment,'8 the right to die is, in
either situation, encompassed within the constitutionally protected
right to privacy. 19 The United States Supreme Court, however, has
denied certiorari in a number of cases where it could have clarified
the constitutional status of the right to die.20 This comment
surveys both federal and state case law concerning the right to die.
Next, it examines the Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutional right to privacy and suggests that the right to die is encompassed within that right.2 ' Finally, this comment proposes practical
guidelines for the application of constitutional principles in right to
die cases.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO DIE IN STATE AND
FEDERAL CASE LAW

Most cases concerning the right to die can be classified into
three categories. The first category encompasses incompetent 22 individuals facing certain death. 23 The second involves competent inincompetent. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The court heard

the case even though the patient, Claire Conroy, died in 1983. Id. at 334, 486
A.2d at 1219. The court noted that the importance of issues presented by appeal
required their resolution despite their mootness. Id.
17. For a discussion of cases which involve the termination of life support
apparatus, see infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of cases which involve the refusal of medical care, see
infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
19. See Delgado, EuthanasiaReconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 474 (1975); Comment, The Right to
Die, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 613 (1974); Comment, The Right ofPrivacy and the Terminally-Ill Patient: Establishing The "Right-to-Die", 31 MERCER L. REV. 603
(1980); Note, Right to Privacy-Removal of Life Support Systems: Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 16 AKRON L. REV. 162 (1982).
20. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
Anderson v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Pericone
v. New Jersey, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Lambrenz v. People ex rel. Wallace, 411 Ill. 618, 109 N.E.2d 767, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952).
21. For a discussion of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which
held that there is a constitutionally protected right of privacy, see infra note 69.
For a discussion of the zone of autonomy created by the right to privacy, see
infra note 72.
22. As used in this comment, incompetency denotes a lack of ability, legal
qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 688-89 (7th ed. 1979). Competency indicates the ability, legal qualification,
or fitness to discharge the required duty.
23. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (young woman described
as being in chronic vegetative state), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re
Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979) (individual in coma with no
hope of return to cognitive sapient life).
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dividuals who are terminally ill. 24 The final category is composed
of physically healthy individuals who have decided to terminate
25
their lives rather than face an unpleasant future.
In re Quinlan26 is an example of the cases encountered in the
first category.27 Karen Quinlan, a victim of a drug overdose, was in
a chronic persistent vegetative state. 28 Karen's father sought to be
appointed as her guardian so that he could authorize the discontinuance of all extraordinary procedures necessary to sustain her vital

processes.

29

The primary issue in Quinlan was Karen's constitutional right
to privacy. 30 The court had little trouble in concluding that if the
constitutional right to privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy under certain circumstances, 3 ' then it was also broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment. 32 More problematic was the
24. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (patient decided not to submit to surgical amputation of gangrenous leg); In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (72 year old patient refused to authorize surgery necessary to save life).
25. See In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984) (prisoner facing life
imprisonment wished to starve himself to death); State ex rel. White v. Narick,
292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) (prisoners fasting in order to secure improved prison
conditions expressed desire to die for the cause).
26. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Quinlan, a
father sought to be appointed guardian of his comatose 21 year old daughter
with the authorization to discontinue all extraordinary procedures necessary to
sustain his daughter's vital processes. Id. at 14, 355 A.2d at 651.
27. See also In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (individual in coma
as a result of damage to her brain stem incurred when her neck was broken);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (terminally ill patient in coma required life supporting apparatus
to maintain vital functions); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (plaintiff did not wish to subject
severely retarded 67 year old man suffering from acute leukemia to chemotherapy treatment); In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979) (individual in a permanent vegetative state with a prognosis of lethalis as a result of
brain stem anoxia); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (1980) (semi-comatose individual on life support system after cardiac
arrest); In re Welfare of Coyler, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (patient in
chronic vegetative state after cardiopulmonary arrest).
28. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
A person in a chronic vegetative state is as an individual who maintains the
vegetative parts of neurological function but who no longer has any cognitive
function. Id. at 14, 355 A.2d at 651. Cognitive functions are the mental
processes of comprehension, judgment, memory and reasoning. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 235 (5th ed. 1979).
29. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 14, 355 A.2d at 651. Karen Quinlan was comatose
and required a respirator to assist her in breathing. Id. at 17, 355 A.2d at 654.
30. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 662.
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
32. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 663. But cf. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (court ordered blood
transfusion administered to 22 year old Jehovah's Witness).
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fact that Karen was incapable of making such a decision. The court
stated, however, that if Karen would have been able to perceive her
irreversible condition without altering her prognosis, she would
have had the right to discontinue her life support apparatus. s3 The
court held that Karen's decision to terminate through natural
forces her non-cognitive, vegetative existence was a valuable incident of her right to privacy, 34 and could not be discarded merely
because Karen was unable to consciously make that decision for
herself. 35 Accordingly, the court ruled that the only practical way
to prevent destruction of the right was to permit a guardian to
36
make Karen's decision for her.
The Quinlan court's recognition that an individual has a right
to die came in the form of a decision requiring that Karen Quinlan's
father be appointed her guardian with the power to decide whether
to continue life sustaining measures.3 7 Quinlan, and its progeny,
however, recognized that such a right was not absolute.3s Arrayed
against an individual's right to die are state interests such as the
preservation of life, 39 the protection of third parties, 40 the prevention of suicide and the provision of latitude for physicians and hospitals to fulfill their ethical obligations. 4 1 Courts must, therefore,
balance the individual's right to die against these state interests.
Generally, as the degree of bodily invasion necessary to sustain life
33. Quinlan,70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 663.
34. Id. at 27, 355 A.2d at 664.
35. Id. A sleeping person has rights, as does someone who has temporarily
lost consciousness. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 936, n.11 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. Someone who has died, however, cannot be said to
have rights in the usual sense. Id. While Karen Quinlan was not dead, the task
of giving content to the idea that she had rights, in view of the fact that she
could make no decisions about how to exercise any such rights, was a difficult
one indeed for the court. Id.
36. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 664.
37. Id. at 34, 355 A.2d at 671.
38. See id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 663; See also Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 735, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re
Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 193, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580, 589 (1979).
39. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 735, 370 N.E.2d at 424; Quinlan,70 N.J. at 26, 355
A.2d at 663; Eichner,102 Misc. 2d at 193, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
40. The third parties that states have a putative interest in protecting are
children and other dependents. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 736, 370 N.E.2d at 425;
Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d at 194, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
41. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 426; Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d at
194, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 590. Courts have expressed concern that individual decisions regarding the prolongation of life might diminish the value placed on the
concept of living. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 426. The Saikewicz
court, however, was ahead of its time in perceiving that the constitutional right
of privacy stands for the proposition that the expression of individual free
choice and self-determination is a fundamental constituent of life. Id. In this
context, the decision to refuse treatment does not lessen the value of life, but it
is the failure to allow a competent human being the right to make that decision
which degrades life's value. Id.
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increases, and the prognosis dims, courts have held that the state's
interest in maintaining life weakens, and the individual's right to
die must prevail. 42
In the first category of cases, courts are presented with the
most compelling arguments for recognition of the right to die.
Although courts are forced to allow a third person to make the incompetent's decision, it is recognized that there is little value in requiring that a person incapable of leading a meaningful life or of
43
contributing to society be maintained on life support systems.
Similarly, it is not fuitful to require a severely retarded person to
undergo serious and potentially painful surgery merely to postpone
an inevitable death.44 Society has no interest in maintaining an unproductive life.
A second category of cases, presenting somewhat less compelling circumstances, involves competent 45 individuals who decline
medical treatment necessary to prolong their lives.46 The circum42. Quinlan,70 N.J. at 27, 355 A.2d at 664.
43. See id. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647. The court did not hesitate to decide that no
compelling interest of the state could compel Karen to "endure the
unendurable, only to vegetate a few measureable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life." Id. at 26, 355
A.2d at 663. One might well ask what the individual and society stand to gain by
allocating scarce medical resources to the maintenance of the remains, the mere
shell, of a once vibrant life. It is this commentator's opinion that there is nothing to gain when life is maintained in this state. Once it is determined that the
condition of a person in a vegetative, non-cognitive state is medically irreversible, every effort to preserve the last vestiges of human dignity should be made.
Hence, the only humane solution is to allow that person's life to terminate by
natural causes.
44. In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977), the court stated that it would make little sense to force
Saikewicz, who was profoundly mentally retarded, to undergo chemotherapy.
Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 430. The court noted that patients who request chemotherapy know the risks involved and can appreciate the painful side-effects
when they arrive. The court questioned the recognizable benefits in forcing
Saikewicz to undergo treatment outside his previous experience that would
cause him pain and discomfort, require his removal to strange surroundings,
and possibly require that he be restrained for extended periods of time. Id. The
court concluded that it could not require Saikewicz to undergo therapy when he
could not comprehend the potential benefits that might be derived from treatment, id., and would die with little pain or discomfort if the disease from which
he was suffering was allowed to run its natural course. Id. at 732, 370 N.E.2d at
421.
45. For the definition of competence, see supra note 22.
46. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (competent adult patient with no minor dependents suffering from terminal illness held to have
constituitonal right to refuse extraordinary treatment); In re Brook's Estate, 32
Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (authorization of blood transfusion without
patient's notice held to be in violation of her constitutional rights); Lane v.
Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (77 year old widow held competent enough to refuse to submit to surgical amputation of her leg even though
it meant certain death); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785
(1978) (72 year old patient competent enough to refuse to submit to amputation
of gangrenous leg); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976) (deci-
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stances under which the decision to die is made in this category are
broader and more varied than in the previous category. Unlike the
cases in the previous category, courts must rule on the validity of a
potentially savable individual's decision to die. 47 The subtle difference between the first and second categories is the distinction between those situations in which the withholding of extraordinary
measures may be viewed as allowing an illness to run its course and
those in which the same actions may be deemed to have been the
48
cause of death.
In the second category, decisions to refuse medical treatment
have been permitted even though the decision amounted to the taking of the patient's own life. 49 For example, courts have supported
the right of a Jehovah's Witness to forego a life-saving blood transfusion because it was against her religion. 5° Courts have also allowed elderly individuals the right to refuse amputation of
gangrenous limbs. 5 ' Thus, courts have permitted individuals to refuse life-saving medical treatment and terminate their potentially
sion by 23 year old patient who was fully competent and had no children to
refuse life saving blood transfusion had to be honored); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962) (adult patient had a right to refuse a blood
transfusion even if medical opinion was to the effect that patient's decision not
to accept blood was just about the taking of patient's own life).
47. In In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 47, 355 A.2d 647, 667, cert denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976), as in Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737,
370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977), the courts noted that in many cases the effect of
using extraordinary measures to prolong life is to "only prolong suffering" but
that physicians distinguish between curing the ill and comforting the dying;
that they will not treat the curable as if they are dying but refuse to treat the
hopeless and dying as if they are curable. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 47, 355 A.2d at
667; Saikewicz, 375 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
48. For a discussion of causation, see infra note 99.
49. Ericson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (1962) (avoidable death certain if individual did not receive blood transfusion).
50. In re Brook's Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). Jehovah's
Witnesses refuse blood transfusions because the Bible prohibits internal consumption of blood in Leviticus 17:10. See also In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390
N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976) (23 year old Jehovah's Witness who was fully competent
could not be forced to accept blood transfusion); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d
27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962) (competent adult refused to allow administration of
a blood transfusion during an ulcer operation); but see Application of President
and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964) (blood transfusion ordered where patient was critically ill and
deemed incompetent by the court); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (court ordered administration of blood
transfusion to Jehovah's Witness after holding that there is no right to die).
51. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (77 year old
widow held competent enough to refuse to submit to surgical amputation of her
leg even though it meant certain death); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super.
282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (72 year old held competent enough to refuse to submit
to amputation of gangrenous leg). See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980) (competent adult patient suffering from a terminal illness has the
constitutional right to refuse or discontinue extraordinary medical treatment).
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savable lives.52
Many of the decisions permitting individuals to choose life over
death speak in terms of the right to refuse medical treatment,
rather than the right to die.5 3 Courts have, however, allowed indi-

viduals to terminate their potentially savable lives even where they
have found the decision repugnant and foolish.54 To be consistent
with a system of government which gives the greatest possible protection to individuals in the furtherance of their desires, individuals
must be allowed, according to some courts, to make even foolish
55
decisions.
The final category involves competent individuals who are
physically healthy, but nonetheless, desire to terminate their
lives.56 In the third category, it is quite clear that the individual's
decision to die is the cause of death, rather than the discontinuance
of a mechanism that postpones an otherwise inevitable death. For
instance, in In re Caulk,57 a healthy inmate in a New Hampshire
state prison, facing a possible life sentence, sought to starve himself
to death.58 Caulk insisted that he was not committing suicide, but
rather was allowing himself to die.59
The Caulk court noted that individuals have a constitutional
right to privacy arising from a high regard for human dignity and
self-determination.6° Such a right may be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily integrity.61 The court found, however, that the state's interests in preserving Caulk's life, namely
preventing suicide and promoting justice, were more compelling
than his right to bodily integrity.62 While the court never expressly
considered Caulk's right to die, its affirmance of such a right is implicit in its analysis of the state's interests which are typically bal52. See e.g., In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976) (young
woman allowed to refuse blood transfusion though suffering from severe, postoperative uterine hemorrhage).
53. For a list of cases which speak in terms of the right to refuse medical
treatment, see supra note 51.
54. In re Brook's Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 374, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965) (court

considered appellant's beliefs to be unwise, foolish and ridiculous).
55. See, e.g., Ericson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706

(1962) (court refused to disregard patient's wishes on the basis of medical opinion alone).
56. In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984); State ex rel. White v.
Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982). These cases involved prisoners starving
themselves to death.
57. 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984).

58. Id. at 227, 480 A.2d at 94.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 230, 480 A.2d at 95.

61. Id.
62. Id.
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anced against the individual's right to die. 63
The decisions allowing individuals to exercise their right to die
have concluded that the right to die is encompassed within their
constitutional right to privacy. 64 The right to die is recognized as a
qualified right which must be balanced against competing state interests. 65 The cases in the first category, concerning terminally ill
imcompetents, and those in the second category, concerning terminally ill competents, represent instances in which the individual's
right to die is deemed to outweigh the state's interest in abrogating
that right.66 The cases in the third category, concerning physically
healthy individuals who wish to terminate their lives, illustrate instances where courts implicitly acknowledge the right to die, but
67
generally find that asserted state interests outweigh that right.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether the
Constitution protects the right of an individual to choose death over
life. 68 Analysis of the case law, however, leads to the conclusion
63. The court's decision that the state interests involved were compelling
obviated the need to examine the nature of Caulk's claimed constitutional
rights. The court's affirmance of Caulk's right to die, however, is implicit in its
decision. Had the court wished to do so, it could have denied that the right of
privacy is broad enough to encompass the right to die and avoided the discussion
of state interests. See id. at 226, 480 A.2d at 93. That the court proceeded directly to such a discussion signifies that the court did in fact believe that Caulk
had a constitutional right to die.
64. For a discussion of cases considering the right to die, see supra notes 2363 and accompanying text.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. But see John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (specifically holding that there is no right to die).
66. For a discussion of category one and category two cases, see supra notes
23-52 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of category three cases, see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
68. In England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 259 F.2d 626
(5th Cir. 1958), reh'g denied, 263 F.2d 661, cert denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959), the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case where the lower court held that the
state cannot deny to any individual the right to exercise a reasonable choice of
method in the treatment of his illness, 259 F.2d at 627, apparently satisfied with
that decision. Also, Chief Justice Burger, while sitting as a Circuit Judge for
the District of Columbia, included the choice of refusing medical treatment,
even at a great risk of death, among the privacy rights. Application of President
and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(denying rehearing en banc) (dissenting opinion). On the strength of these
cases, one court has held that there is a constitutional right, encompassed by the
right of privacy, to choose the controversial treatment of acupuncture. Andrews v. L.G. Ballard, D.O., 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1050-51 (S.D. Tex. 1980). In another case, however, the Supreme Court permitted the government to interfere
with the interstate shipment and sale of Laetrile. United States v. Rutherford,
442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979). The court noted that to allow Laetrile, with no proven
effectiveness, to be used in the treatment of cancer "would lead to needless
deaths and suffering among patients characterized as terminal who could actually be helped by legitimate therapy." Id. at 557. This decision raises the question of whether or not the Court would allow an individual to refuse life saving
medical treatment as the lower courts have done.
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that the right to die is encompassed within the constitutional right
to privacy.
II.

PRIVACY: PROCREATION, ABORTION AND THE RIGHT TO DIE

In Griswold v. Connecticut,69 the Supreme Court held that a
constitutionally protected right to privacy existed within the
penumbras 70 of the Bill of Rights. 7 ' In doing so, the Court created a
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the executive director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticuit, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and
medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. Id. at 480. The
Court noted that section 53-32 of the General Statutes of Connecticuit (1958
rev.), under which the appellants were convicted, provided that "[a]ny person
who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing contraception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." Id.
In addition, § 54-196 of the Connecticut statute provided that "[alny person who
assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender." Id.
Appellants were found guilty as accessores and fined $100 each, against their
claim that the accessory statute as so applied violated the fourteenth amendment. Id.
The Supreme Court held that the state could not make the marital use of
contraceptives a crime and, therefore, could not punish someone who provided
married persons with contraceptives, or with information concerning their use,
for the crime of aiding and abetting such use. Id. at 485. Although the separately concurring Justices offered differing rationales, the majority opinion was
plainly outraged at the only imaginable means of enforcing the law. Justice
Douglas' majority opinion asked whether the Court would "allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of martital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives?" Id. at 485.
Griswold was the genesis for the modern day right of privacy and marked
the beginning of a new area of judicial intervention into state legislation. Time
and again the Court has stepped in to strike state legislation as violative of its
new right of privacy. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas criminal
abortion statutes held unconstitutional); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (procedural requirements of Georgia criminal abortion statutes held unconstitutional). That the right of privacy is controversial goes almost without saying.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Roe, 410 U.S. 171-78, likened the majority's decision to the long defunct majority opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), a case indicative of an era in which the Supreme Court was quite willing
to scrutinize and invalidate economic regulations pursuant to the due process
clause. One commentator has gone so far as to regard privacy as but a name for
"a bag of unrelated goodies." TRIBE, supra note 35, at 887.
The right of privacy draws its controversial nature from the fact that it is
not explicitly stated in the Constitution. The Griswold Court found the right
lurking in the penumbras emanating from the various guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). As a result, decisions
invoking the right of privacy have been met with stiff resistence and sometimes
violent opposition. The abortion decisions, more than fourteen years after
their inception, remain the instigators of violent public reaction. See e.g., Florida, More Abortion Bombings, NEWSWEEK, January 7, at 17 (1985).
70. Webster's Dictionary defines a penumbra as "[a] space of partial illumination ...between the perfect shadow on all sides and the full light;" "[a] surrounding or adjoining region in which something exists in a lesser degree."
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 625 (7th ed. 1967). Illusory, in-
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zone of autonomy which protects individuals from governmental intrusion.72 To determine whether the right to die lies within this
zone of individual autonomy, one may analyze the judicial treatment of an analogous interest: the right to terminate a pregnancy. 73 The decisions considering the right to terminate a
pregnancy , however, do not address the individual's interest in terminating his life.74 Yet there are similarities between the two situations which suggest that the rationale of the abortion cases may be
75
extended to right to die cases as well.
In Roe v. Wade,76 the Court held that the right to privacy is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy. 77 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon a
series of cases which found a constitutionally protected interest in
decisions concerning procreation, marriage, and family life. 78 Its
deed! Illusion is defined as the "perception of something objectively existing in
such a way as to cause misinterpretation of its actual nature." Id. at 415.
71. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
72. Id. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1411
(1974). Professor Henkin argues that, with respect to the right of privacy, the
Court has been vindicating not a right to freedom from official intrusion, but a
right to freedom from official regulation. Id. at 1424. He states that the denomination "right of privacy" is, therefore, misleading, if not mistaken, Id. at 1410,
in that the right has brought little new protection for what most people think of
as privacy; the right to be free from unwanted intrusion, to be secreted and
secretive, a right to be unknown. Id. at 1419. Henkin correctly notes that what
the Supreme Court has given us is something essentially different and farther
reaching; an additional zone of autonomy of presumptive immunity from governmental regulation. This becomes apparent when reviewing the privacy
cases. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting decision to terminate pregnancy during first trimester from regulation); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479
(protecting the right to use contraceptives from regulation).
73. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, and Doe, 410 U.S. 179.
74. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
75. For a discussion of the similarities between the right to die and the right
to have an abortion, see infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. In Roe, a pregnant single woman brought a class action challenging the
constitutionality of Texas' criminal abortion laws, which proscribed procuring
or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving
the mother's life. Id. at 117-18. After a detailed review of the history of abortions, the court held that in the first trimester of pregnancy a woman, upon the
advice of a physician, could decide to terminate her pregnancy free from state
regulation. Id. at 163. The court held that in the second trimester, the state's
important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother reached the compelling point, justifying state regulation of abortion procedures. Id. Finally, the
Court held that after the point of viability, approximately the beginning of the
third trimester, the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of life might
permit it to completely proscribe abortion. Id.
78. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to privacy includes
right of individuals to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to marry is one of
the vital personal rights essential to man's orderly pursuit of happiness); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (marriage and procreation are fundamen-
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examination of those cases revealed that the decisions protected by
the right to privacy satisfy two criteria: first, they are personal decisions involving an individual's self or family, and second, they are
important decisions affecting one's life or development. 79 These
two criteria suggest that the right to privacy extends to other important and intimate areas as well.80 Indeed, recent Supreme Court
opinions signal that decisions concerning marriage, procreation, and
family life are merely illustrative of the types of decisions that fall
8
within an individual's constitutionally protected zone of privacy. '
Roe v. Wade and its progeny are the latest in a long line of cases
that protect the right to make important decisions about personal
matters against governmental intrusion. The common law held
that there is no right more sacred than the right of every individual
to possess and control himself, free from any restraint or interference from others.8 2 The Supreme Court echoed this maxim when it
83
held that the right to reproduce is one of man's basic civil rights.
The Court has also recognized and afforded equal protection to an
individual's decision not to bear a child.8 Together, these holdings
stand for the proposition that the individual shall control whether
he or she will be the source of another life. When the abortion
cases are regarded as part of a series of decisions allocating the
choice of whether to bear a child, they represent a view in favor of
leaving the choice with the individual rather than the majority,
rather than a decision in favor of abortion 85 The abortion decisions
can be viewed, therefore, as a reaffirmation of the principle that the
tal to the very existence and survival of the race); Pierce v. Sociey of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (unreasonable interference with the liberty of parents and

guardians to direct the upbringing of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (the rights of an individual to choose a vocation, bring up children, and
worship God according to his own conscience are essential to man's orderly pursuit of happiness).
79. Andrews v. L.G. Ballard, D.O., 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(court performed similar examination of privacy cases).
80. See supra note 78 for a partial list of the rights presently included
within the right to privacy.
81. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court stated that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Id. at 453.
82. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (Court stated
that the right to one's person may be equated to a "right of complete immunity
to be let alone").
83. Skinner,316 U.S. at 541 (struck down state law providing for the sterilization of anyone convicted two or more times for felonies involving moral
terpitude).
84. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (struck down state law prohibiting the sale of
contraceptives and giving advice on how to properly use contraceptives).
85. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 933. Professor Tribe argues that the abortion
decisions might lose some of their controversial character if viewed in this context. Id.
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constitutional right to privacy protects an individual's autonomy in
making decisions which involve intimate matters. 86 No decision
ever made is more intimate or momentous than the decision to terminate one's own life.8 7 The right to die is, therefore, a logical extension of the right to privacy and should be considered to fall
within its zone of autonomy.
Besides the intimacy factor, other similarities exist between
the abortion decisions and the right to die. The three categories of
cases developed above88 illustrate the close parallel between abortion cases and right to die cases. In Roe v. Wade,8 9 the Court concluded that the right of privacy encompasses the abortion decision,
but that the right is qualified and must be balanced against important state interests. 90 In developing guidelines to determine when
the state's interests become sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
individual rights, the Court examined the stage of pregnancy at
which the abortion was sought. 91 This method of analysis fostered a
resulting framework wlhich is equally applicable to the three categories of right to die cases developed above. 92
The Roe Court held that during the first trimester of pregnancy, the patient and her physician should be free to determine,
without state regulation, whether the patient's pregnancy should be
terminated. 93 The woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy
86. Delgado, EuthanasiaReconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect
of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 474, 477 (1975).
87. Cf. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (in ruling on whether a patient could choose to undergo acupuncture, the court held
that one's health is a uniquely personal possession and that the decision of how
to treat that possession is of a no less personal nature).
88. For a discussion of the right to die as developed in lower court cases, see
supra notes 23-63 and accompanying text.
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. Id. at 154. Deciding when state interests outweigh individual interests,
however, proved troublesome for the Court. See id. at 154-64. The Court refused to isolate the woman in her pregnancy. Id. at 159. Texas argued that life
begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that it therefore
had a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. Id.
Although the Court agreed that the state's interest in protecting life was compelling, it refused to accept Texas' theory on when life begins. Id. at 162-63. To
do so would have allowed Texas to proscribe abortion entirely, which the Court
was unwilling to do. The pregnant woman also had rights at stake. Id. Faced
with assertions that life begins at conception and the fact that the Constitution
does not define the word "person," the Court chose to side-step the issue of
when life begins. Id. at 147-64. The Court held that at some point the health of
the mother became a significant state interest. Id. The Court also held that the
state's interest in the potentiality of life becomes compelling at the point of
viability, when the fetus "presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb." Id. at 163 (emphasis supplied).
91. See id. at 159-64.
92. For a discussion of the three categories, see supra notes 22-63 and accompanying text.
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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within the first trimester is analogous to the first category of cases
allowing for the terminally ill incompetent's decision to terminate
life support measures or refuse medical treatment.9 4 Any asserted
state interests are outweighed and the individual should be allowed
95
to make the decision to terminate life without state interference.
The Roe court held that at the beginning of the second trimester the state's interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling.96 From that point on a state may regulate the abortion
procedure. 97 Decisions to seek an abortion during the second trimester are similar to those decisions in the second category where
terminally ill, but competent, individuals choose to terminate or refuse medical treatment. 98 Abortion during the second trimester
may jeopardize maternal health and, if the patient dies, may be
deemed to have been the cause of death. Similarly, the decision of a
terminally ill, competent individual to refuse necessary medical
treatment may be deemed to have been the cause of death. 99
94. For a discussion of category one cases, see supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
95. One recognized state interest is the maintenance of the integrity of the
medical profession. See infra note 113. Arguably this interest applies to any
decision to die. It may also be said to apply to the decision to terminate a pregnancy through abortion. It does not appear to rise to the point of being compelling in either category one right to die cases or first trimester abortion cases.
96. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
97. Id. The state may regulate the procedure as a necessary measure to
protect maternal health. Id. The facts indicated that, due to modern medical
techniques, the mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions appeared
to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth. Id. at 149.
98. For a discussion of category two cases, see supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
99. All the category one decisions allowed necessary care to be terminated
only if the incompetent was irreversibly vegetative or suffered from a terminal
illness, the treatment of which would only postpone an inevitable death. To
date, no court has allowed a guardian to refuse treatment on behalf of an incompetent suffering from a curable condition. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.S.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981) (guardian not permitted to refuse blood transfusions
on behalf of severely retarded man bleeding from ulcers in his bladder); In re
Sampson, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253, 37 A.D.2d 668 (1971) (parents' religious beliefs not
allowed to interfere with blood transfusions necessary to save minor child's
life), affd, 292 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918 (1972). In category two, however, the
courts have allowed individual's to refuse potentially curable medical treatment. For a discussion of category two cases see supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. The act of refusal is, therefore, the cause of death; not the illness.
In category one, the illness is the cause of death, not the act of refusal.
While all the cases cited in category two affirm the individual's decision to
die, this affirmance was in some instances given begrudgingly. See, e.g., In re
Brook's Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (court held that decision to
refuse blood transfusion must be honored even though foolish). It is conceivable that a situation could arise where a court would hold that the state's interests in preserving life and protecting third parties outweighed the individual's
interests. In In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 300 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976), the court
affirmed a young woman's decision to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion only
after finding that she was competent, was not pregnant, and had no children.
Id. at 975, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 524. A state would, therefore, probably be allowed to
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Finally, the Roe Court held that the state's important and legitimate interest in potential fetal life becomes compelling at viability:
a point near the beginning of the third trimester.1 0 0 The state will
not permit010 an abortion during that period because the fetus presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb.10 2 An analogous situation is found in the case of the physically healthy individual who decides that death is preferable to
life.' 0 3 To date, courts have refused to permit a physically healthy
individual to decide that death is preferable to life and then act on
that decision. 10 4 The state's interests are considered compelling
under these circumstances. 0 5 Protecting potential fetal life and
preventing physically healthy individuals from terminating their
lives are quite similar. 10 6 As with state regulations of abortion after
the point of viability, state regulations abrogating a physically
healthy individual's right to die will most likely be upheld as
07
constitutional.
effect regulations to further these interests in a category two situation, much as
it can regulate abortion procedures to ensure maternal health during second
trimester abortions. See supra note 97 for a discussion of second trimester abortion regulation.
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
101. Id. Such proscription was held to be qualified when abortion becomes
necessary to save the life or health of the mother. Id. at 163-64.
102. Id. at 163.
103. For a discussion of category three cases, see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
104. For a list of citations to category three cases, see supra note 25.
105. For a discussion of category three cases, see supra note 56-63 and accom-

panying text.
106. Teriminating the life of a viable fetus through abortion is feticide. See,
e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (Supp. 1983). Section 9-1 of Chapter 38 defines murder as an intentional killing without lawful justification. Ch. 38, § 9-1.
Because murder is not expressly limited to the killing of one person by another,
under Illinois law the taking of one's own life can be construed as murder.
Chapter 38 includes murder and feticide under the general heading of "homicide." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9 (1983).
107. Like a woman forced to bear an unwanted child, an individual forced to
continue life while suffering severe physical and psychological detriments faces
the prospect of a distressful life and future. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973). The individual who is compelled to continue living may be required to
exhaust his personal fortune in an undertaking not of his own choosing can be
likened to the mother forced to raise a child whose care she does not choose to
assume. Finally, one commentator has argued that the overtones of population
growth, pollution, and poverty present in the abortion cases have companions in
the issue of self-determination.
Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered-The
Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 474, 479
(1975). Delgado argues that, in view of their shortage and attendant high cost,
the use of medical facilities to compel the unwilling to live misallocates scarce
resources. Id. In addition, he points out that disallowing a person the right to
die, in appropriate circumstances, forces an individual to deplete personal financial resources which they might prefer to distribute to loved ones rather than
the medical profession. Id.
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SUGGESTED GUIDELINES

The Roe interest analysis is beneficial in establishing guidelines
for the application of constitutional principles in right to die cases.
It allows for a balancing of the individual's interests in remaining
free from governmental intrusion against the state's interests in interfering with the exercise of an individual's constitutional rights.
When one state interest becomes sufficiently compelling, it governs
over the individual's discretion to act on a desired goal.' 08 As each
separate and discrete state interest' 0 9 becomes compelling at a different point,"l 0 the individual's constitutional right is further restricted. This process is evident from the varying deference
accorded the abortion decision based upon the trimester in which
the decision is made."' State interests in interfering with a person's decision to terminate his or her life also become compelling at
different points, depending upon which of the three categories an
2
individual falls within."
There is little justification for state interference with the decision to terminate the life sustaining care required to keep an incompetent individual facing certain death alive."l 3
Under these
circumstances, the state's interest in abrogating the right to die is
not sufficiently compelling."14 The restrictions that should be applied in deciding not to postpone the death of a terminally ill incompetent are procedural in nature and are designed to ensure that the
decision is correct under the circumstances1. 5 Once the decision is
108. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (Court stated that the
state's interests in regulating abortion increase as the woman approaches term,
and at some point during pregnancy become compelling).
109. The primary state interests with respect to the abortion issue are the
protection of maternal health and the potentiality of life. Id. at 163.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. For a discussion of the three categories, see supra notes 22-63 and accompanying text.
113. While the state's interest in maintaining a high standard of medical ethics is always present, it is not necessary to interfere significantly with the decision to protect this interest. For a discussion of the underlying justification for
this interest, see supra note 41. There is a major concern that the value of life
will be diminished if guardians are allowed to decide when to terminate an incompetent's life with no government intervention, and thus substantially eroding medical ethics. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 735, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977).
114. A terminal diagnosis obviates the state's interest in preserving life
where it is unlikely that there are third persons, such as dependent children,
that require protection. For cases defining the interests of third parties, see
supra note 40. In addition, it does not amount to suicide to refuse medical treatment and thus avoid the postponement of death. For a discussion of suicide, see
supra note 14.
115. The decision to terminate life-sustaining care for a terminally ill incompetent should not be made in a cavalier fashion. It is clear that the person
making the decision for the incompetent must arrive at a decision that the in-
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made, the steps necessary to carry out that decision may be taken
with little or no state interference.
In the case of a competent, yet terminally ill, individual who
decides to refuse treatment, 116 the state's interest in preserving life
and protecting third parties becomes sufficiently compelling. Unlike the trimester framework employed in the abortion cases, the
boundaries between the three right to die categories are frequently
blurred. The broad range of factual situations found in this second
category will affect the ultimate fate of the individual's right to die.
For instance, elderly, competent individuals can refuse their consent to having a gangrenous limb amputated with little or no governmental interference, even though the decision may be deemed
to be the cause of the individual's death.117 This situation closely
resembles that in the first category because it is unproductive to
require an elderly adult to submit to the amputation. 1i8 On the
other hand, a court order requiring a young mother to submit to a
blood transfusion may be justified as compelling on the basis of the
state's interest in preserving life and protecting children. 119
In the second category, therefore, courts will consider the patient's age and the number of dependents. Elderly individuals without dependent children will be afforded greater latitude in deciding
to refuse life saving medical treatment. Young adults with depencompetent, if able to and given the circumstances, would have made. In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 37, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). The Supreme Court of New
Jersey has recently set out three tests for legal guardians to follow in determining the actual wishes of the incompetent patient. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985). The subjective test considers the patient's own statements,
such as a living will, or any other evidence, such as religious beliefs. Id. at 335,
486 A.2d at 1229-31. For a general discussion of living wills, see Comment, The
"Living Will"--An Individual'sExercise of His Rights of Privacy and Sef-Determinations,7 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 714 (1976); Note, The "Living Will": The
Right to Death With Dignity? 26 CASE. W. RES. 485 (1976). The limited objective standard includes some trustworthy evidence of the patient's wishes. In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. at -, 486 A.2d at 1232. In addition, the decision maker must be
satisfied that the burdens of a patient's continued life, with the treatment, outweigh the benefits of life. Id. Finally, in the absence of trustworthy evidence,
the guardian can use a purely objective standard. The guardian must find that
the net burdens of the patient's life, with the treatment, must clearly outweigh
the benefits of life, and any unavoidable, recurring and severe pain associated
with the ailment would be inhumane if the patient continued to live. Id. at 342,
486 A.2d at 1232. The court indicated that such determinations would be subject
to state administrative review. Id. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1241.
116. For a discussion of category two cases, see supra notes 45-55.
117. See Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
118. For further discussion of category one characteristics, see supra notes 46
& 47 and accompanying test.
119. See In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1976)
(court specifically noted that patient was competent, was not pregnant, and did
not have children when it upheld decision to forego blood transfusion on religious grounds).
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dent children will be denied the privilege of exercising their right to
die.
Turning to the third category of cases, a physically healthy person's decision that death is preferable to life 120 is similar to the decision to terminate a pregnancy during the third trimester. Under
these circumstances, total proscription of the individual's right to
die is justifiable. 121 The state interests of preserving life, protecting
third parties, maintaining medical ethics, and preventing suicide are
sufficiently compelling. 122 Under no circumstances, therefore,
would a physically healthy individual be allowed to exercise his or
her right to die.
Application of these guidelines will better illustrate the usefulness of the foregoing analysis and answer the rhetorical question
previously posed: Is society, within the framework of the right of
privacy, capable of providing Mathew with an alternative to a painful existence? The first step is to categorize Mathew's situation.
The second step is to examine the state's interests in preserving his
life. Finally, Mathew's interests must be examined and balanced
against those of the state.
Mathew's situation is most analogous to that encountered when
123
a terminally ill, yet competent individual decides to refuse care.
Mathew's vital functions would ultimately cease without proper
care. Because Mathew's situation falls into the second category, the
state's interests in preserving his life and protecting third parties
must be viewed as compelling. 124 For the state to prevail over
Mathew's fundamental right to die, 12 5 however, it must prove that
120. For a discussion of category three cases, see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of the similarities between third trimester abortions
and category three decisions to die, see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of these state interests, see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
123. For a discussion of Mathew's condition, see supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
124. For a discussion of category two cases, see supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
125. For a general discussion of fundamental, or preferred rights, see TRIBE,
supra note 35 at 564-75. The Supreme Court has provided no clear definition of
what rights are considered fundamental. Certainly those rights expressly set
forth in the Constitution are fundamental. The Court has, however, defined
some rights not expressly contained in the Constitution as fundamental. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy as existing in the
penumbras emanating from the Bill of Rights). To obtain the requisite insight
on this issue, it is necessary to examine the criteria which the Court applies in
its efforts to identify what rights are fundamental. In the past the Court has
searched for "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental" and thus "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), for those principles basic to "our system of jurisprudence," In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948),
and for principles that are required for the protection of ultimate decency in a
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its actions are necessary to promote a compelling governmental incivilized society. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). Professor Tribe contends that the enterprise of discovering and defending fundamental constitutional rights is inseparable from the much larger enterprise of
identifying the element of being human. TRIBE, supra note 35 at 574. Therefore, to assert that the right to die is a fundamental right is to elevate it to the
level of "those attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood."
Id. at 889. Two separate lines of argument help to define the elements of being
human.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), wrote that the founding fathers "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone ..
" Id. Brandeis' right to be let alone has been suggested as the basis
for the judicial recognition of a right of personhood. See Craven, Personhood:
The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699 (1976). The idea of a fundamental
right of personhood rests on the idea that, even though one's identity is constantly altered by the rewards, penalties, and constraint's of one's social environment, the personhood resulting from this process is sufficiently one's own to
be deemed fundamental in confrontation with governmental intrusion. TRIBE,
supra note 35 at 890. Noting that to define liberty is to confine it and to that
extent deny it, Justice Craven asserts that an individual should retain the right
to engage in any form of activity unless there exists a countervailing state interest of sufficient weight to justify restricting his conduct. Craven, supra at 706
(1976). At a minimum, personhood would encompass the freedom to engage in
any activity which injures no one else. Id.
In seeking to define the necessary elements of personhood, another commentator would examine the idea of human rights as expressed in the Constitution. Richards, ConstitutionalPrivacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning of
Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 327 (1981). Richards suggests
that the idea of human rights can be focused upon in terms of two features:
rational autonomy and equality. Id. at 339. Autonomy, in the sense basic to
human rights, is an assumption about the capacities of individuals, as people, to
act on higher order plans of action that take as their object one's life and the
way it is lived. Id. This is the central difference between animals and humans:
no animal other than man appears to have the capacity for self evaluation. Id.
at 340. It is this autonomous nature of people that the Constitution seeks to
protect and which the right of privacy shields from arbitrary governmental intrusion. The idea of human rights places an equal weight on each person's capacity for autonomy and expresses equal concern and respect for the capacity of
people to equally develop and take ultimate responsibility for how they live
their lives. Id. at 343.
Together the right to personhood, as espoused by Craven and Richards'
analysis of constitutional human rights through the ideas of rational autonomy
and equality, stand for the proposition that individuals are capable of making
certain intimate decisions with regard to their lives and that they should be
allowed to do so as long as society at large is not injured. To this end, the
Supreme Court has protected such basic human elements as, for example, procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); marriage, Loving v. "Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); the right to possess and enjoy obscene literature in private,
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and the right of a woman to terminate
her pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973). It becomes apparent that it is intimate matters, such as these basic decisions concerning the every day lives of people as human beings, that are the
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. Because people have such
broad latitude in defining the meaning of their lives, they must have, consistent
therewith, the corollary right to define the meaning of their deaths. By ac-
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terest. 126 The question that must be answered, therefore, is
whether prohibiting Mathew from refusing proper care is necessary
127
to protect the state's asserted interests.
Mathew's life is punctuated with pain and misery; his condition
is terminal. He has no dependents. Mathew's mind, however, is
clear and sharp and the possibility exists that he can make a contribution to society. Therefore, the state has a legitimate interest in
maintaining his life. The state's interest is outweighed, however,
when balanced against the reality of. Mathew's shattered life
marked with mental and physical pain and suffering. 128 Much as a
young adult has the right to refuse a blood transfusion for religious
reasons, 129 Mathew should be allowed to refuse medical treatment
and, thereby, terminate his life.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The right to die is encompassed within the constitutional right
to privacy. The courts, increasingly called upon to render opinions
concerning decisions to die, lack effective guidance because the
Supreme Court has not issued a firm statement on the constitutional status of the right to die. Individuals seeking to exercise
their right to die are forced to do so through a long and cumbersome judicial process. In some instances, a favorable judgment is
not received until long after the individual's death.
The cases which have developed the right to die can be grouped
into three categories. These categories fit neatly into the Supreme
Court's consideration of the abortion decision based upon the trimester in which the abortion is sought. Applying the Court's reasoning in the abortion decisions to right to die cases establishes
workable guidelines for courts faced with a future right to die decision. Individuals should not have to suffer while the ponderous
mechanism of the law grinds slowly toward an inevitable conclusion-individuals have a right to die.
Vincent T Borst

knowledging the right to die in appropriate circumstances, we secure to persons
the fundamental human right upon which they may call their life their own.
126. For a general discussion of this strict scrutiny standard, see J. NowAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 418-19 (2d ed. 1983).
127. Id.
128. Society has a superficial interest in a creative mind. Requiring a tortured individual to continue to live in order that society may access such a mind
at its leisure, however, cannot be justified under any circumstances.
129. In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1976).

